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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The publication of the human genome has elicited commentary to the effect that since 
fewer genes were identified than anticipated, it follows that genes are less important to 
human biology than anticipated.  The flaws in this syllogism are explained in the context 
of a treatise on how genomes operate and evolve and how genes function to produce 
embryos and brains.  Most of our most cherished human traits are the result of the 
emergence of new properties from pre-existing genetically scripted ideas, offering 
countless opportunities to celebrate the evolutionary process.        
 
 
Key Words:  Human Genome, Emergence, Stephen J. Gould, Embryology, 
Neurogenesis 
 
 
 
The Incredible Shrinking Genome 
 
 I remember when I first heard about it a few months ago, the rumor that they 
weren’t finding the 100,000 genes they were expecting for humans, that it was going to 
be more like 40,000 (the first rumors).  And I smiled to myself.  “Uh-oh,” I thought, “this is 
going to freak people out.” 
 
 So now it’s down to more like 30,000, and now everybody knows what we 
already knew, which is that there are 20,000 genes in a roundworm and 25,000 genes in 
a tiny mustard plant.  For many persons this has meant the final death knell for those 
scientific imperialists who keep telling us that  “genes are everything.”  As in this offering 
from Robin McKie, science editor for the London Observer (2/11/01): 
 
 Scientists have made a radical breakthrough in our understanding of human 
 behaviour with the discovery that we possess far fewer genes than previously 
thought.  The discovery of our meager gene numbers - by two major groups of 
international scientists - reveals that environmental influences are vastly more 
powerful in shaping the way humans act.  Their analysis of the first human 
genetic map - known as the genome - show that we have as few as 30,000 
genes, the blueprints for brain and body cells.  This is a far lower total than 
expected, and dramatically undermines claims that human beings are prisoners 
of their genes.... 
 
 We are more free, it seems, than we had realized. The discovery that humans 
 have far fewer genes than previously thought... has led scientists to reignite a 
 debate that has split philosophers, educationalists and social reformers for 
 millennia.  There simply aren't enough genes, researchers now suggest, to have 
 one each for all the characteristics that have been associated with them, from 
 alcoholism to criminality to intelligence. The finding is a setback for those who 
 believe we are largely pre-programmed, and a fillip to those who insist we are 
 formed by our experiences. Nurture, the scientists now suggest, is far more 
 important than nature. 
 
 
The gene stock fell from 100 to 30 in a single round of journalism. 
 
 In this essay I will indicate what genome projects, and the parallel breakthroughs 
in our understanding of embryology, cellular differentiation, and neurogenesis, are in fact 
telling us about how we came to be and who we are.  After which I will offer a short 
homily on the concept of emergence. 
 
 
How Embryos Happen 
 
 The first common ancestral genomes encoded the “core ideas” found in the 
genomes of all living organisms, organisms that are now members of three 
superlineages -- the prokaryotes (bacteria), the archea (hot-springs inhabitants), and the 
eukaryotes (ourselves and most of the creatures we knowingly encounter).   These core 
ideas include 1) encoding biological instructions in DNA, copying those instructions, and 
transmitting them to the next generation;  2) manifesting these instructions functionally in 
the shapes of proteins, proteins that interact with and modify one another; 3) encoding 
regulatory proteins that modulate the expression of target genes by recognizing shapes 
in DNA sequences that lie “upstream” of the genes themselves;  and 4) running 
metabolic pathways and DNA replication/repair systems using the same time-tested sets 
of “housekeeping” enzymes.  After the great 3-way split, each superlineage utilized 
these core ideas to pursue its own styles of niche acquisition, with the eukaryotes 
coming up with some permutations that undergird their particular life cycles and patterns 
of radiation. 
 
 For the eukaryotes, gene numbers did increase -- while the bacterium E. coli has 
4200 genes, yeast has 6000, flies 14,000, worms 20,000, and mustard 25,000.  But the 
numbers don’t get us very far psychologically -- why should a tiny plant that just sits 
there have 11,000 more genes that a fly that makes brain-based decisions?   Nor do 
they tell the tale.  The real trick was not an increase in gene number.  The trick was the 
invention of multicellular embryology, with a separate germ line to deal with the 
transmission of instructions to the next generation.  In embryos, somatic cell types 
differentiate from one another, and then influence the subsequent differentiation of one 
another, to form the final niche-negotiating organism (or organisms if the life cycle 
includes larval stages).  And embryos use genes and their regulatory modules with great 
economy and stunning ingenuity.   
 
 A gene carries the instructions for making a particular protein shape, but a 
protein rarely generates a phenotype on its own.  Instead, it combines with other 
proteins, and the resultant protein complex interacts with other protein complexes, and 
so on.  Once there is embryology, a particular cell type will express one set of genes and 
differentiate along one pathway, while a second cell type will express a second set of 
genes and differentiate along a second pathway.  Should a given gene be expressed in 
the first cell type at a particular stage of development, its protein product will encounter a 
particular set of "partner proteins" to interact with, whereas should it be expressed in the 
second cell type, where a second set of genes is being expressed, many of the partner 
proteins on offer will be quite different.   
  
 Thus a protein expressed in an embryonic neural lineage may participate in 
constructing the brain, but this same protein, when expressed with different partners in 
an embryonic gut lineage, may participate in constructing the pancreas.  That is, the 
process is deeply combinatorial, and as we know, combinatorial systems can generate 
large numbers of variants with a small number of initial units -- and 30,000 is hardly a 
small number.  Moreover, embryos are set up to keep the combinatorial process going:  
certain protein complexes in a given cell type have the necessary configuration to switch 
on the next set of genes, whose protein products then make the next set of protein-
partner choices, paving the way for the next round of cell-type differentiation.  And finally, 
the cells themselves influence the expression of one another's genes as they make 
contact with one another during embryonic development. 
 
 Proteins engage in dazzling informational feats of their own.  Consider the “idea” 
of the protein kinase, an idea that has arisen independently in several evolutionary 
lineages.  Just as there are enzymes that catalyze “housekeeping” activities, so also are 
there enzymes that can modify one another, the most popular modification being to 
attach phosphate groups at targeted amino-acid positions.  Enzymes with this activity 
are called protein kinases.  When a kinase recognizes the shape of its target protein and 
adds a phosphate group to it, the presence of the phosphate induces the target protein 
to adopt one of its two shape possibilities, the other possibility being the shape it adopts 
when the phosphate is absent  (a kind of toggle-switch arrangement).  The phosphate-
induced conformational change will, in turn, allow the target protein to bind to its 
downstream partners, and so on, resulting in a cascade of consequences.   Particularly 
elegant are protein kinase cascades, where in one case a protein kinase kinase kinase 
phosphorylates a protein kinase kinase which can then phosphorylate a protein kinase 
which can then phosphorylate its target protein.  And what gets this cascade started?  
The presence of a growth-stimulating hormone.  And what is the final target protein?  A 
protein which, when phosphorylated, induces the expression of genes necessary to 
undergo growth and cell division.  Cascades such as these undergird numerous cellular 
responses to their circumstances and numerous cell-cell interactions during 
embryogenesis.       
  
 But the real wild cards in embryology are the so-called “upstream” modules, the 
DNA sequences that govern whether, and when, their “downstream” genes will be 
expressed.  These modules are not constrained to code for functional protein shapes; 
their only constraint is that they carry sequences that protein shapes recognize.  Thus an 
upstream sequence ATAGGCTAT will adopt one DNA-helical shape and ATAGGTTAT 
another, and a regulatory protein (also called a transcription factor) can discriminate 
between the two, bind to one or the other, and influence whether the adjacent gene 
expresses its encoded protein.  As in this example.  
 
 Imagine a gene with a single upstream module, and a transcription factor which, 
when it binds to that module, allows the gene to be expressed.  The analogy can be to a 
lamp (the gene) with a single on-off switch:  the gene is “on” when the transcription 
factor binds to the module and “not-on” when it doesn’t.  Imagine now that this gene 
carries a second upstream module with the capacity to bind a second transcription factor, 
where the binding of the second protein interferes with the binding of the first and hence 
nullifies its “on” activity.  If the second protein is present in cell-type B but not cell-type A, 
the result will be that our gene is “off” in cell-type B and “on” in cell-type A:  the 
regulation of the gene’s expression has become cell-type-specific.  Cell-type C, derived 
from B, builds upon this arrangement, expressing a protein kinase with the capacity to 
phosphorylate the second and modulate its shape and hence its “off” activity:  the more 
phosphorylation, the less the second protein can exert its “off” influence and the more 
the gene is “on.”  The switch has acquired a “dimmer” unit.  Moreover, if levels of this 
kinase display a gradient along an animal embryonic axis such that cells destined to give 
rise to an organism’s head contain much more of it than cells destined to give rise to the 
tail, our original gene will be “on” in the head lineage and “off” in the tail lineage and 
“intermediate” in the thorax, with cascading consequences for each pathway.   
 
 Genes important for cell-type determination in embryos in fact carry long strings 
of such upstream modules that display highly diverse regulatory-protein binding patterns 
in different cell lineages.  Lamps with on-off switches have evolved into jet-age lighting 
systems, and most of this is accomplished with combinatorial algorithms.  Moreover, 
much of animal and plant evolution is driven by mutational changes in these upstream 
modules such that genes are expressed at different times and/or in different cell types 
during embryonic development.  (For readers not familiar with our spectacular recent 
understandings of how embryos work, I warmly recommend Enrico Coen’s “The Art of 
Genes:  How Organisms Make Themselves” (Coen, 1999) and Eric Davidson’s 
“Genomic Regulatory Systems in Development and Evolution” (Davidson, 2001)).     
 
How Brains Happen 
 
 The human organ that we're most interested in, our sentient brain, starts out as 
we’ve just described, with cell types differentiating into particular neural lineages.  But 
complex brains like ours then go on to develop in a robustly "epigenetic" fashion, where 
epi- means building “upon” the genes and not “beyond” the genes, as some seem to 
misunderstand the term.  During brain development, key genes are expressed ab initio 
and key genes are expressed along the way, but most of what happens is the 
consequence of cell-cell interactions and local cell-hormone interactions that are carried 
out by the proteins.  The information encoded in the protein shapes mediates countless 
interactions between the vast network of neuronal cells.  They contact and stimulate and 
inhibit one another in a combinatorial fashion reminiscent of the genetic regulatory 
circuits that set up embryos, and hence neurogenesis, in the first place.  They migrate 
past one another, responding to mutually elaborated directional cues, and trigger 
phosphorylation cascades in one another.  They compete with one another for access to 
growth hormones and electrical connections.  Many survive, many others die off.  
Nurture is involved in the sense that poor maternal health or nutrition can adversely 
affect the outcome, but otherwise, the outcome has a life of its own:  genetically 
instructed, epigenetically realized. 
 
 Genes set all this up, and in this sense human brains are “pre-programmed” -- no 
genes, no brain -- but they don't directly participate in most of the "decisions" made as 
the brain develops:  we left behind some time ago the notion that there's a “gene for" this 
neuronal connection or that one.  Indeed, given the trillions of neural connections in the 
brain at birth, not to mention those that form as a consequence of experience, 100,000 
genes are no more up to the task than 30,000.     
 
 To be sure, faulty versions of key genes can compromise the project.  Usually 
the failures occur early in neurogenesis and the embryo fails to survive, but certain 
genes, for example, may influence the course of neurogenesis in such a way that the 
final outcome is a brain that may go on to develop schizophrenia.  In this sense 
schizophrenia is heritable, and the faulty genes that participate in this outcome may 
come to be dubbed the “schizophrenia genes.” But this is shorthand, a shorthand that 
has, regrettably, led to much of the confusion about the 30,000 number.  Whatever the 
“schizophrenia genes” turn out to be, they will almost certainly prove to be team players.  
 
The Emperor’s New Clothes 
 
 So now we can step back and contemplate our genome with fresh perspective.  
Consider, for example, the genome-project announcement that there are “only” 300 
genes in the human that are not also found in the mouse.  Three hundred now starts to 
look like a large number.  If one of these new genes were to be expressed early in the 
lineages giving rise to neurons of the prefrontal cortex, quite different patterns of 
precortical wiring might result:  Effect A, generated by the new gene, might influence 
outcome B which would modulate outcome C.  Another of the new gene products might 
alter the configuration of a gene-regulating protein complex such that a gene expressed 
at day-12 in mouse neurogenesis would not be expressed until the analogous day-15 in 
the human, again with multiple consequences.  Such changes in the timing of embryonic 
gene expression are called heterochronic, and heterochrony accounts for much of the 
diversity among embryos.  Indeed, when we learn, as we will, that we share almost all of 
our genes with the chimpanzee, heterochrony will emerge as the most likely explanation 
for most of our differences. 
 
 A second observation to come from the human genome project is that if our DNA 
genome can be said to be six feet in length, then our 30,000 genes occupy less than one 
inch of the total (Rick Weiss, Washington Post 2/11/01).  Most of the rest is an apparent 
wasteland of dead genes and pieces of “selfish” DNA that hitch-hike along for the ride, 
the replicating enzymes being blind as to what they copy.  Different lineages vary 
enormously in how much of this stuff they carry along:  yeast has very little of it, 
presumably because of selection for streamlined genomes in rapidly dividing organisms, 
while salamanders have much more of it than we do.  Some news reports have 
attempted to put a positive spin on this, proposing that the non-genic DNA may be DNA-
in-waiting, poised to contribute to evolutionary change.  Others have even suggested 
that this DNA contributes to mysterious properties such as spirituality (suggesting that 
the salamander is more spiritual than we are?).  But most of these proposals seem both 
strained and to miss the point.  The point is that whenever you have a memory system 
where the copying function is not stringently edited, “junk” will accumulate.  The wonder 
is that we and other creatures forge ahead despite this major design flaw. 
 
 And indeed, design, at least in the way we humans use the term, seems to have 
little to do with what we encounter in genomes.  Rather, they record a history of tinkering.  
With the sequence of a human gene in hand, we can go to computer databases and ask 
whether a similar gene has been found in other organisms, such similar genes being 
called paralogues.  The answer is that ~50% of human genes have paralogues in yeast, 
and ~75% of human genes have paralogues in worms.  The evolutionary explanation for 
this finding is that when a gene arises that encodes a “good idea” -- a protein domain 
that is particularly adept at phosphorylation, or at binding to iron or to DNA or to another 
cell -- then that idea gets used again and again as other genes arise.  Indeed, new 
genes are rarely “created from scratch”.  Instead, a gene duplicates and the second 
copy accumulates new mutations, or else pieces of several old genes splice together to 
form a new hybrid gene such that several “good ideas” show up in the same protein 
product, much as a car might be fabricated using a Rolls engine and a Chevy chassis.  
The overwhelming evidence for tinkering as the core evolutionary process is, to my mind, 
the most important intellectual insight to emerge from genomics. 
 
The Gould Response 
 
 This essay must now be put in a temporal context.  The morning after I wrote the 
above paragraphs, there appeared an op-ed in the New York Times (2/19/01) by 
Stephen Jay Gould, which I quote in near-full length.  The echoes of Robin McKie of the 
London Observer should be apparent.  
 
 
 The fruit fly Drosophila, the staple of laboratory genetics, possesses between 
 13,000 and 14,000 genes. The roundworm C. elegans, the staple of laboratory 
 studies in development, contains only 959 cells, looks like a tiny formless squib 
 with virtually no complex anatomy beyond its genitalia, and possesses just over 
 19,000 genes. 
 
The general estimate for Homo sapiens — sufficiently large to account for the 
vastly greater complexity of humans under conventional views — had stood at 
well over 100,000, with a more precise figure of 142,634 widely advertised and 
considered well within the range of reasonable expectation. Homo sapiens 
possesses between 30,000 and 40,000 genes, with the final tally almost sure to 
lie nearer the lower figure. In other words, our bodies develop under the directing 
influence of only half again as many genes as the tiny roundworm needs to 
manufacture its utter, if elegant, outward simplicity. 
 
Human complexity cannot be generated by 30,000 genes under the old view of 
life embodied in what geneticists literally called (admittedly with a sense of 
whimsy) their "central dogma":  DNA makes RNA makes protein — in other 
words, one direction of causal flow from code to message to assembly of 
substance, with one item of code (a gene) ultimately making one item of 
substance (a protein), and the congeries of proteins making a body. 
 
We may envision several kinds of solutions for generating many times more 
messages (and proteins) than genes, and future research will target this issue. In 
the most reasonable and widely discussed mechanism, a single gene can make 
several messages because genes of multicellular organisms are not discrete 
strings, but composed of coding segments (exons) separated by noncoding 
regions (introns). The resulting signal that eventually assembles the protein 
consists only of exons spliced together after elimination of introns. If some exons 
are omitted, or if the order of splicing changes, then several distinct messages 
can be generated by each gene.  [Au:  This mechanism is called alternative 
splicing] 
 
The implications of this finding cascade across several realms. The commercial 
effects will be obvious, as so much biotechnology, including the rush to patent 
genes, has assumed the old view that "fixing" an aberrant gene would cure a 
specific human ailment. The social meaning may finally liberate us from the 
simplistic and harmful idea, false for many other reasons as well, that each 
aspect of our being, either physical or behavioral, may be ascribed to the action 
of a particular gene "for" the trait in question. 
 
But the deepest ramifications will be scientific or philosophical in the largest 
sense. From its late 17th century inception in modern form, science has strongly 
privileged the reductionist mode of thought that breaks overt complexity into 
constituent parts and then tries to explain the totality by the properties of these 
parts and simple interactions fully predictable from the parts. ("Analysis" literally 
means to dissolve into basic parts). The reductionist method works triumphantly 
for simple systems — predicting eclipses or the motion of planets (but not the 
histories of their complex surfaces), for example. But once again — and when 
will we ever learn? — we fell victim to hubris, as we imagined that, in discovering 
how to unlock some systems, we had found the key for the conquest of all 
natural phenomena. Will Parsifal ever learn that only humility (and a plurality of 
strategies for explanation) can locate the Holy Grail? 
 
The collapse of the doctrine of one gene for one protein, and one direction of 
causal flow from basic codes to elaborate totality, marks the failure of 
reductionism  for the complex system that we call biology — and for two major 
reasons. 
 
First, the key to complexity is not more genes, but more combinations and 
interactions generated by fewer units of code — and many of these interactions 
(as emergent properties, to use the technical jargon) must be explained at the 
level of their appearance, for they cannot be predicted from the separate 
underlying parts alone. So organisms must be explained as organisms, and not 
as a summation of genes. 
 
Second, the unique contingencies of history, not the laws of physics, set many 
properties of complex biological systems. Our 30,000 genes make up only 1 
percent or so of our total genome. The rest — including bacterial immigrants and 
other pieces that can replicate and move — originate more as accidents of 
history  than as predictable necessities of physical laws.  Moreover, these 
noncoding regions, disrespectfully called "junk DNA," also build a pool of 
potential for future use that, more than any other factor, may establish any 
lineage's capacity for further  evolutionary increase in complexity. 
 
            The deflation of hubris is blessedly positive, not cynically disabling. The failure of 
reductionism doesn't mark the failure of science, but only the replacement of an 
ultimately unworkable set of assumptions by more appropriate styles of 
explanation that study complexity at its own level and respect the influences of 
unique histories. Yes, the task will be much harder than reductionistic science 
imagined. But our 30,000 genes — in the glorious ramifications of their 
irreducible interactions — have made us sufficiently complex and at least 
potentially adequate for the task ahead. 
 
We may best succeed in this effort if we can heed some memorable words 
spoken by that other great historical figure born on Feb. 12 — on the very same 
day as Darwin, in 1809.  Abraham Lincoln, in his first Inaugural Address, urged 
us to heal division and seek unity by marshaling the "better angels of our nature" 
— yet another irreducible and emergent property of our historically unique 
mentality, but inherent and invokable all the same, even though not resident 
within, say, gene 26 on chromosome number 12. 
 
  
 Let me begin by commenting on alternative splicing, a mechanism I omitted from 
my earlier account.  By invoking alternative splicing (and flies and worms do alternative 
splicing as well), the human numbers can be pushed back “up” to something closer to 
100,000 if each gene is assumed, on average, to be alternatively spliced three different 
ways:  you basically get three proteins for the price of one gene.  I omitted alternative 
splicing from my account because my core argument is that it is not the number of genes 
that’s important, but their combinatorial properties.  Increasing the protein number to 
100,000 does not explain how animal, and particularly mammalian, genomes achieve 
their results.  In fact, alternative splicing is yet another elegant example of gene-
controlled regulation.  A gene is spliced in a particular fashion to yield a particular protein 
depending on its cell-type context:  gene a is spliced to yield protein A1 in one cell type 
and spliced to yield protein A2 in a second cell type.  The splicing enzymes are 
responding to gene-driven cues.  It’s still genes all the way down. 
 
 If my paragraphs preceding the Gould op-ed have succeeded, my reader should 
be able to recognize some of the flawed premises and conclusions that he offers.  
Nothing is awry with the “central dogma,” and the doctrine of one gene for one protein 
(or three proteins) has in no way collapsed.  The notion of “one direction of causal flow 
from basic codes to elaborate totality” has not been the doctrine of biology for the past 
50 years:  the studies of Jacob and Monod on bacteria in the 1950s offered elegant 
evidence that many genes generate proteins that bind to the upstream modules of other 
genes and influence their expression, generating anything but a uni-directional causal 
flow.  And yes, it can be said that organisms are indeed “a summation of their genes” 
once it is grasped that this means that “organisms are a combinatorial summation of 
their gene products and regulatory sequences.”  Humans may well have “better angels,” 
and these will indeed not be encoded by gene 26 on chromosome 12.   Instead, we now 
understand that a wondrous collaboration of genetics and epigenetics creates human 
brains with their “historically unique mentality”. 
 
 There is a passage where Gould says things along these lines:  “The key to 
complexity is not more genes, but more combinations and interactions generated by 
fewer units of code.” But he then goes on to say:  “Many of these interactions...must be 
explained at the level of their appearance, for they cannot be predicted from the 
separate underlying parts alone.”  This is correct, but those participating in genome 
projects never thought otherwise.  To have the sequence of a genome, and hence the 
sequences of its encoded proteins, does not indicate how an organism works.  Having a 
genome sequence is analogous to a linguist having a list of the words (proteins) used by 
a particular culture.  With the list in hand, she can go to databases and in many cases 
trace the etymology of particular words, often thereby obtaining clues as to what concept 
they might encode.  And then, list in hand, the next project is to understand how these 
words fit together, in grammar and syntax and context, to generate the language, and 
hence the understandings, of the culture. 
 
 Now that we have in hand the list of human proteins, and have some clues as to 
what some of them may be doing from the study of simpler organisms, the next project 
does not entail predicting their interactions with DNA and with one another, but rather 
studying these interactions, using the same methodical reductionism as before.  A whole 
array of technologies is available to analyze the expression, co-expression, interactions, 
and function of genes and proteins.  Indeed, these techniques have been under 
intensive development during the past decade by biotechnologists who have been 
anticipating this next and most intriguing post-genomics level of analysis.  Gould predicts 
that an “ultimately unworkable set of assumptions” (reductionism) will be replaced by 
“more appropriate styles of explanation” that study “complexity at its own level,”  but it is 
not apparent how he envisions this study of complexity-at-its-own-level to take place with 
reductionism disallowed.    
 
 Meanwhile, from my bottom-up perspective, I predict that organisms will indeed 
eventually be explainable as a summation of their gene products, with the sums mind-
boggling but not irreducible.  Reductionism has not “failed for the complex system that 
we call biology.”  It has only just gotten started.  How far we want to take the resultant 
understandings along the path of technological application, and in which directions, are 
urgent questions that plead for informed dialogue, but these difficult issues are 
independent of the discovery process itself.  
 
 As for humility, I myself prefer the testimonial of Robert Waterston, Director of the 
Washington University Genome Center.   It's a humbling perspective, Waterston told 
Weiss of the Washington Post.  A person who gazes upon the human genome, he said, 
is likely to walk away feeling a little bit less the center of attention, less certain about 
being the sole purpose of it all.  "You can't study the genome for very long before you 
start feeling that you're just a transient vehicle for making more DNA." 
   
 But I was heading towards the concept of emergence, and I will take Gould and 
McKie along with me. 
 
 
Emergence        
 
  Just as there was the great three-way split in the evolution of organisms, so do I 
observe a trifurcation, with many intergradations, in theistic responses to the scientific 
worldview.  One path “rejects science,” usually in favor of something more familiar and 
presumably more meaningful.  The second path posits that God designed/planned the 
universe and life -- photons and DNA and all -- with something in mind that we can come 
to discern.  And the third is to posit that God is the process, the unfolding, the 
manifestation.  Those of us who are awkward with God-talk can nonetheless join in 
consecrating the process of becoming.   
 
 And to do so is to declare the sacredness of all these genomes, flawed and junk-
filled and gerry-rigged as they may be.  Genomes are absurd.  They really are.  Small 
islands of meaningful genes and their regulatory modules floating in seas of 
meaningless sequences, each gene some crazyquilt of former ideas.  Their very 
absurdity calls us yet again to acknowledge, in Gordon Kaufman’s wonderful phrase, the 
serendipitous creativity of Nature (Kaufman, 1995).  And in biology, serendipitous 
creativity is all about emergence. 
 
 I have offered an explanation of emergence in the previous volume of this journal 
(Goodenough, 2001) and will only summarize here.  Granted that biological traits (and 
hence their summation as an organism) are constructed from protein-protein and 
protein-gene interactions, it also the case that these interactions repeatedly generate 
emergent properties, “something more from nothing but.”  For example, the ability of a 
neuron to stimulate or suppress the firing of another neuron is nothing but the 
summation of hormonal neurotransmitters, ion fluxes, and the electrical excitability of 
membranes, all of which can be reduced to their component parts.  But it generates 
something more:  neural communication.  The communication is an emergent property, 
one that is then acted upon by natural selection:  In a population of animals, those with 
neurons that communicate well are more likely to survive and produce viable offspring 
than those with neurons that communicate less well.  In selecting for communication, 
what is in fact being selected are the genetic programs that give rise to brains with 
communicative properties.  The genes, the nothing-buts, don’t go away, but the 
emergent traits emerge as life’s mode of creativity.         
 
 Gould states that the “better angels of our nature” are yet another “irreducible 
and emergent” property of our mentality, but “inherent and invokable all the same.”  I 
would respond that it is not coherent to state that an emergent property is irreducible; if 
something is emergent, then it emerged from that to which it can be reduced.  Our 
historically unique mentality, I would say, is reducible, and robustly emergent, and (not 
but) inherent and invokable.  Our mentality takes off from the capacities inherent in our 
gene-instructed epigentically-crafted brain, and our brains are fashioned to be eminently 
invokable and to be instructed and deeply complexified by nurture and environment and 
experience.   
 
 We are not prisoners of our genes.  Rather, we are beholden to them for 
producing bodies that work and brains that allow us to be human.   
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